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The Fed-Strategy: Successful but Out-of-Date? 1
1 Introduction
Opinion about the American monetary policy of the past 10-15 years is divided.
On the one hand several economists are convinced that the wise policy of the
Federal Reserve (Fed) has mainly contributed to the exceptional performance of
the US economy in the 1990s.1 This performance has been especially great in
the second half of the 1990s with real growth rates of more than 3.5 % and low
inflation rates of about 2 %. This is why some economists call the 1990s the
“Fabulous Decade”.2
On the other hand the strategy of the Fed is strongly criticized. While other
central banks like the Bank of England or the European Central Bank (ECB)
have made intensive efforts to present the general public with a clear and com-
prehensible strategy the Fed is – according to these critics – lacking such a clear
framework.3 Instead of a well-articulated strategy the Fed has its “Magician”
Greenspan. Some economists have meanwhile described the Fed as one of the
most opaque and unclear central banks (among the most prominent ones).4 This
paper will attempt to examine if these reproaches against the Fed-Strategy are
justified and if the Fed should revise its policy concept.
The paper firstly describes the current framework of the Fed, especially its
targets and its operational procedure and shows possible deficits. The result of
this theoretical analysis suggests in fact that the Fed’s behavior is neither
rule-orientated nor transparent. But as can be shown in the second part of the
paper this academic and critical view of the Fed policy contradicts the market’s
opinion about the Fed policy. From the markets’ perspective the Fed-Strategy
seems to be highly transparent and credible.
1 “Monetary policy is the key factor behind ‘The Long Boom’.” (Taylor [1998b], p. 5). See
also Mankiw (2001), or Blinder/Yellen (2001).
2 See Blinder/Yellen (2001).
3 See e.g. Cecchetti (1999), Svensson (2001), or Mishkin (2000).
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The paper proceeds as follows: The second section touches briefly on the
issue as to why it might be important for a central bank to present a clear mone-
tary policy strategy. Section 3 takes a close look at the targets of the Fed. Sec-
tion 4 describes the current procedure of the Fed in monetary policy and tries to
assign the Fed-Strategy to a common framework such as Inflation Targeting or
the Taylor-Rule. Section 5 looks at the Fed-Strategy from the markets’ perspec-
tive, especially the markets’ judgment about the credibility and transparency of
the Fed as being of central interest.
2 The Rationale for a Clear Monetary Policy Strategy
Since a central bank cannot directly control its final targets (usually inflation and
output) it is necessary to formulate a plan or program to achieve these targets. In
other words, a central bank needs a monetary policy strategy.5 Such a strategy
has an internal and external function:6
 Internally the strategy should structure the process of decision-making and
therefore provide the basis for an efficient information processing.
 Externally the strategy takes the role of a communication instrument that
should help to explain monetary policy decisions to the public.
Here the external function is at the centre of attention because there is no
doubt that the Fed carries out an efficient information processing.7 The deficits
are seen in the external presentation. The two main arguments that are put for-
4 Goodhart called the Fed as “the perhaps most unclear central bank” (FAZ [2001d], p. 14;
translation D.H.) when presenting a case study about the transparency of several central
banks.
5 “The monetary policy concept is nothing else than a plan or program to achieve the tar-
gets of monetary policy.“ Roth (2002), p. 9 (translation D.H.). See for alternative defini-
tions of the term “monetary strategy” e.g.: Issing (1996), p. 254, or ECB (2001b), p. 40.
6 See e.g. ECB (1999a), pp. 47/48, Winkler (2000), pp. 15-18, or Bofinger et al. (1996), p.
243.
7 The detailed and extensive data analysis can be regarded as one of the main features of
the Greenspan era, see Mankiw (2001), p. 49.
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ward in favor of a transparent strategy are: Enhanced credibility and predictabil-
ity:
Credibility: Even if the famous model of time inconsistency (see
Barro/Gordon [1983], Kydland/Prescott [1977]) that originally opened the de-
bate is increasingly questioned, central bankers and academics agree therein that
credibility is an important matter for monetary policy.8 The announcement of a
strategy can be seen as one means to build credibility.9 It is an effort to capture
the systematic behavior of monetary policy. It describes to the public how
monetary policy reacts to the arrival of new information. The strategy therefore
assures the public that the central bank will react to similar economic situations
in the same (predictable) manner. Later the central bank can not easily deviate
from this systematic description of its behavior without losing public confi-
dence. This is why the announcement represents a form of commitment.
Predictability: Until quite recently opacity and secrecy were characteris-
tics of monetary policy.10 In the mean time a lot of central banks prefer to be
predictable for the markets. Some central bankers even argue that monetary pol-
icy is most effective when the markets correctly anticipate monetary policy de-
cisions.11 They emphasize the central role of market expectations in the mone-
tary transmission process. A transparent and open central bank can improve the
influence on market expectations and bring them into better alignment with cen-
tral bank intentions. For example if financial markets anticipate a monetary eas-
8 In a study which was carried out by Blinder all questioned central bankers and academics
considered credibility as very important, see Blinder (1999), pp. 3/4. High credibility
guarantees for example stable private inflation expectations despite a negative supply
shock. Therefore credibility can improve the trade-off between output and inflation vari-
ability, see Clarida et al. (1999), pp. 1675-1683.
9 See Issing et al. (2001), pp. 38 and 45, as well as Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 242/243.
10 See e.g. Goodfriend (1986).
11 “…monetary policy works best when Fed policy actions are completely anticipated by
the time they occur. “ Poole (2001). See also Blinder pp. 70-73, Blinder et al. (2001), p.
11, Roth (2002), pp. 2-4, Ferguson (2002).
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ing (series of short-term interest rate cuts) long term interest rates will drop and
support the intentions of the central bank to stabilize economic growth.
A strategy is an instrument to improve the predictability of the central
bank. One task of the strategy is to translate the often very complex decision-
making process into a comprehensible “language” for the public.12 A strategy
should provide a “common understanding”13 between the central bank and the
public. For this some central banks use simple rules or indicators as a means of
communication. Even if a rule oversimplifies (and is not strictly followed) it is
still a reference point around which the communication can be structured.14
A central bank that manages to present a systematic and understandable
strategy gains in credibility and transparency. This contributes to an improved
efficiency in monetary policy since such a bank acts on the basis of low inflation
expectations and stable market reactions.
There are some elements that central banks increasingly use to improve the
transparency of their monetary strategy:
Targets: Most central banks have announced explicit numerical inflation
targets.
Models: Central banks begin to publish their centrally used macroecono-
metric models.15 This reveals the central bank’s thinking about
the monetary transmission process.
Indicators: Some banks (e.g. ECB, Suisse National Bank) emphasize the role
of the money supply for monetary policy and use this indicator
preferentially to explain their decisions.
12 See Winkler (2000), pp. 23-25, and Spahn (2001), pp. 8-11.
13 Winkler (2000), pp. 8, and 23.
14 The German Bundesbank has for example used a monetary target as a communication
instrument that simplified the communication process. However, it did not strictly follow
the rule.
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Forecasts: Quite a lot of central banks meanwhile publish their estimates of
future inflation and output development.
Simple rules: A few banks use simple rules to support their arguments. The
Sveriges Riksbank for example explains its basic actions with a
“simple rule of thumb”.16
In the following sections we will examine if the Fed also uses these elements to
communicate with the public and if the Fed has succeed in being transparent and
credible.
3 The Targets of the Federal Reserve System
3.1 The Dual Mandate: Price Stability and Full Employment
The monetary policy targets are the basis of each strategy. The Fed’s targets are
predetermined by the Federal Reserve Act. According to this act the Fed should
seek to promote effectively the goals of:17
1) maximum employment
2) stable prices
3) moderate long-term interest rates
The second goal – stable prices – is not a controversial objective. There is a
great consensus among the monetary policy profession that price stability is an
indispensable part of the monetary goals. Fed officials also see price stability as
the primary long-run goal of monetary policy.18 They mention again and again
15 See e.g. Bank of England (1999b).
16 „… if the inflation forecast … is in line with the target at the time horizon of twelve to
twenty-four months, then the monetary stance is appropriate.” Berg (1999), p. 48.
17 Quoted from Board of Governors (1994), p. 17.
18 “... price stability ... is elevated to the status of the primary long-run goal of monetary
policy.“ Ferguson (1998), p. 2. “... we have kept our focus firmly on the ultimate goal of
achieving price stability.” Greenspan (1997). “This ... makes price stability (in some
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that central banks could quite well control inflation in the long term and that
price stability is a major perquisite for a good economic performance.19
More problematic and misleading is the first goal “maximum employ-
ment”. It certainly does not mean an unemployment rate of zero percent because
this would lead to accelerating inflation.20 Maximum employment is rather in-
terpreted as the highest possible level of employment that is compatible with
price stability. This is for example the interpretation of the former Fed Governor
Meyer:
“... the goal of maximum employment is usually interpreted as maximum
sustainable employment – meaning the highest level of employment that can be
maintained without upward pressure on inflation.”21
The unemployment rate that corresponds to this level of employment is
also called the NAIRU22. This is why some interpret the goal of “maximum em-
ployment” as stabilization of the unemployment rate around the NAIRU.23 There
is also a consensus that the NAIRU itself is not controllable by the Fed, but is
instead mainly determined by the labour market conditions and structures.24
shape or form) the direct, unequivocal, and singular long-term objective of monetary pol-
icy.” Meyer (1998), p. 2.
19 “A stable level of prices appears to be the condition most conducive to maximum sus-
tained output and employment ...“ Board of Governors (1994), p. 17. “... a central bank’s
vigilance against inflation is more than a monetary cliche; it is, of course, the way we ful-
fil our ultimate mandate to promote maximum sustainable growth.” Greenspan (2001b).
20 “In the presence of a price stability objective, it [maximum employment] cannot possibly
mean the largest number of jobs that the economy can generate.“ Blinder (1997), p. 4.
21 Meyer (2001), p. 2.
22 NAIRU = Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment.
23 See Blinder (1997), p. 4.
24 “This rate [NAIRU] - ... – is a fact outside the control of the FOMC.“ Meyer (1998), p. 2.
According to Yellen hysteresis effects might be relevant for the European but not for the
American monetary policy, see Yellen (1996), pp. 2/3.
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So the general attitude of the Fed towards the connection between mone-
tary and employment policy might be summarized in the following way:
1) In the long-term monetary policy is neutral. A permanently expansion-
ary policy does not lead to higher growth rates or to a higher level of employ-
ment.
2) In the short run however deviations from the maximum sustainable
level of employment are possible. A central bank should make use of its ability
to smooth these deviations.
The third objective of the target list – moderate long-term interest rates – is
usually not viewed as an independent one.25 Instead it is normally assumed that
it will be automatically achieved with price stability. Therefore the Fed has a
dual mandate. It should provide for price stability and full (“maximum”) em-
ployment and full employment is regarded as achieved when the unemployment
rate equals the NAIRU.26
Such a dual mandate that equally values full employment and price stability
is unusual today.27 Most laws of central banks mention only a price stability ob-
jective or give price stability clear priority. In this case we speak of a hierarchi-
cal mandate with price stability at the top of hierarchy.28 The outsider role of the
Fed will become clear with the following table.
25 See Meyer (2001), p. 2, and Svensson (2001), p. 3.
26 “The mandate is therefore interpreted as a dual mandate: full employment and price sta-
bility.“ Meyer (2001), p. 2. “The Federal Reserve Act mandates that we promote price
stability and maximum employment.“ Fergusen (1998).
27 “... among the OECD central banks, the Fed stands out as being the only one with such a
broad mandate.“ Wyplosz (2001), p. 5.
28 See Meyer (2001), p. 1.
The Fed-Strategy: Successful but Out-of-Date? 8
Table 1: „Dual“ versus „Hierarchical Mandate“
MANDATECENTRAL BANK
Dual Hierarchical
QUANTITATIVE
INFLATION GOAL
Federal Reserve X No
European Central Bank X < 2 %
Bank of Japan X No
Bank of England X 2.5 %
Reserve Bank of Australia X 2-3 %
Bank of Canada X 1-3 %
Swedish Riksbank X 2 %
Suisse National Bank X < 2 %
RB of New Zealand X 0-3 %
Bank of Korea X 2.5 %
The Fed’s dual mandate seems to be antiquated but most Fed Governors
accept and defend it. When they are talking about policy goals they always em-
phasize that apart from price stability the second rather short-term goal is stabi-
lization of output and employment. Mitigating economic swings is naturally
seen as a task of monetary policy:
Greenspan: “... we have attempted not only to lean against the potential for
an overheating economy, but also to cushion shortfalls in economic growth.“29
Ferguson: ”..., in the shorter run, monetary policy can play an important
role in stabilizing the economy from undesired fluctuations in economic activity
and inflation.“30
Yellen: “In my view, monetary policy is needed, and has succeeded, in
smoothing the ups and downs of the business cycle ... It thus follows that stabili-
zation of output and employment is a second appropriate goal for the Federal
Reserve.“31
29 Greenspan (1997).
30 Ferguson (1998).
31 Yellen (1996), p. 3.
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The Fed mentions explicitly that a conflict between the two goals is possi-
ble and that in some situations the employment target is at the centre of attention
while the inflation target has to step back. Examples for this could be periods of
demand weakness or a negative supply shock. It is said in an official publication
of the Federal Reserve Board for example:
“... in the short run, some tension can arise between the efforts to maximize
employment and output. ... In these circumstances, makers of monetary policy
must decide the extent to which they should focus on defusing price pressures or
on cushioning the loss of output and employment.“32
Such a situation occurred in 2001 when the Fed worried more about weak
employment and growth development than about the danger of inflation and this
already at a time (January 2001) when the actual inflation and employment data
suggested rather a violation of the inflation target.33 The FOMC finished each of
its Press Releases after an open market meeting with the following comment:
“The Committee continues to believe that, against the background of its
long-run goals of price stability and sustainable economic growth ... the risks
are weighted mainly toward conditions that may generate economic weakness in
the foreseeable future.”34
The Fed knows that its policy is not able to provide permanent full em-
ployment and cannot eliminate each economic cycle. Greenspan again empha-
sized this point a short while ago.35 But this does not change the fact that the Fed
32 Bord of Governors (1994), pp. 17/18. „Even after price stability has been attained, there
will remain some tradeoff between the volatility of real outcomes and reducing the vola-
tility of inflation ...“ Yellen (1996), p. 4.
33 In the fourth quarter 2000 the inflation rate (CPI) was above 3 %, while the unemploy-
ment rate was clearly below the common estimations of the NAIRU (5 – 5.5 %).
34 Press Releases of the FOMC statement: 03.01.01, 31.01.01, 20.03.01, 18.04.01, 15.05.01
etc.
35 “But do we [the central bank] have the capability to eliminate booms and busts in eco-
nomic activity? ... The answer, in my judgment, is no ...” Greenspan (2001b).
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at least tries hard to reduce fluctuations in output and employment. Blinder in
particular pointed out that the criticism of “fine-tuning” in monetary policy
should not lead to a complete abjuration of any stabilization policy.36
If we compare this attitude of the Fed towards the goals and tasks of mone-
tary policy with the view of the European Central Bank on these issues we can
see a clear difference. European (especially German) policy makers have a dif-
ferent philosophy of monetary policy from American central bankers.37 The
German Bundesbank for example which dominated the European monetary pol-
icy before 1998 has always refused to act as an economic stabilizer and focused
its attention on price stability.38
This is way the Bundesbank always justified interest rate cuts with argu-
ments such as “monetary expansion weakens”, “inflation rates are declining” or
“the price climate relaxes” but not with the need to improve the economic de-
mand.39 The ECB seems to continue with this tradition. Just after the beginning
of the monetary union Duisenberg pointed out that the attempt to steer the econ-
omy in the short run would be “overambitious and therefore risky”.40 This is
why the ECB explained its interest rate cuts in the year 2001 (until September
11) with the declining inflation pressure and not with the need to strengthen
economic demand.41
36 See Blinder (1997), p. 12. Yellen argues similarly: “I recognize the difficulty of conduct-
ing monetary policy over time in a way that will damp business cycles ... The record [of
monetary policy] to me indicates that within limits ‘tuning‘ works, even if it’s not fine.“
Yellen (1996), pp. 3/4.
37 See e.g. Hüther (2001), p. 35, Barbier (2001), p. 13, or Fehr (2001), p. 13.
38 A statement that the Bundesbank used to justify its very cautious monetary easing in the
recession year 1993 is typical for this thinking: „ A more forceful monetary easing that is
motivated by the exchange rate or the economic situation risks to have a counterproduc-
tive effect on the economy at a whole.” Deutsche Bundesbank (1993), p. 63 (translation
D.H.).
39 An overview of the explanations for reductions in German prime rates in 1993 and 1994
gives Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 274-276.
40 Duisenberg (1999), and see Bofinger (1999), p. 6.
41 The FAZ commented the ECB decision of Mai 2001 in the following way: “Duisenberg
explained the interest rate cut of the ECB – certainly in explicit contrast to the Fed – ex-
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However the Fed has not been willing so far to state more precisely its gen-
eral targets of price stability and full employment with the help of numerical
quantities. According to Greenspan price stability is reached when: “inflation is
so low and stable over time that it does not materially enter into the decisions of
households and firms.” Greenspan (2001c).
To sum-up, we can say that the Fed has got the legal mandate to promote
price stability and full employment. Full employment is not interpreted as an
unemployment rate of zero percent but as the maximum level of employment
that is compatible with price stability. This dual mandate that equally values
both targets is today rather an exception. In new modern central bank laws price
stability is normally given the highest priority. But for American policy makers
it is natural to fight not only against inflation but also against an economic
slump. At some times (weakening demand, negative supply shock) it is even
possible that the Fed mainly concentrates on the full employment goal. The lim-
its of monetary policy are also clear for the Fed. Monetary policy is neither able
to eliminate completely economic cycles nor is it able to bring the US economy
onto a higher growth path. However, the Fed does not specify the exact level of
its targets.
clusively with the reduced inflation pressure in the medium-term and not with reference
to the economic downturn.” FAZ (2001b), p. 1 (translation D.H.).
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3.2 The Criticism of the Fed’s Target Definition
If we consider the criticism of the Fed’s legal mandate and its interpretation we
can distinguish two sides. On the one hand there are complaints about the un-
clear target definitions (the missing quantification, the vague employment tar-
get); on the other hand some economists disapprove principally of the dual man-
date.
At first it is conspicuous that the Fed is one of only a few central banks that
does not possess a numerical inflation target (see table 1). In some respects this
can be disadvantageous:
 At times with low inflation – e.g. 3 % – it is unclear for the public if price
stability is achieved in the Fed’s sense or if the Fed is more ambitious and
will carry out further restrictive actions in the near future.
 It is also unclear as to which price index the Fed gives primary considera-
tion. There are some indications that the Fed does not pay most attention to
the commonly used consumer price index but instead to the index of per-
sonal consumption expenditure (PCE).42
 Without an explicit inflation target the Fed lacks a nominal anchor and
therefore inflation expectations have no point of orientation when inflation
rises temporarily.43
42 “..., there has been little, if any acceleration in the index of core personal consumption
expenditure prices, which we consider to be a more reliable measure of inflation [than the
CPI]. “ Greenspan (2001b). Since February 2000 the FOMC measures the inflation fore-
casts which are presented in the Congressional Reports on the basis of the PCE-index in-
stead of the CPI-index; see Board of Governors (2000a), p. 37 (footnote).
43 “... this strategy makes it harder for the Fed to contain the medium-term effects of a sup-
ply shock because the absence of a nominal anchor makes inflation expectations more
susceptible to rise when this occurs. “ Mishkin (1999), p. 600.
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 An official, numerical inflation target would also help to improve the inter-
nal decision-making process since the Fed Governors obviously have dif-
ferent opinions about the appropriate inflation level.44
For these reasons even some Fed Governors have already approved a con-
crete inflation target.45 But we could also make some points against a precise
numerical definition or rather the issue of target definitions could also be re-
garded more calmly:
 If the public looks at the inflation development of the previous years it can
easily deduce a target range for the inflation rate of 1-4 %. Since 1998 we
can recognize that private inflation expectations stabilized – without a clear
target definition – at a level of 2.5 % (see chapter 5).
 Some Fed Governors emphasize that in a time of rapid technological
change and a lot of intangible goods (e.g. software) it becomes more and
more difficult to measure inflation exactly. For this reason the specification
of a numerical inflation target “would represent an unhelpful and false pre-
cision”. Greenspan (2001c).46
 The benefit of a quantitative inflation target as a means of gaining higher
credibility is rather limited in the case of the Fed since it already has quite a
high reputation in inflation fighting.47 Even if the Fed does not have a pre-
cise nominal anchor it is only scarcely conceivable that inflation fears
would increase spontaneously after a negative supply shock in the USA.
44 See Cecchetti (1999), p. 3, and Blinder (1997), p. 5.
45 The former Fed Governor Meyer has proposed an inflation target of 2 % (CPI) for the
Fed. One percent point should take measurement errors into account and the other percent
point should be a cushion of flexibility for the Fed, see Meyer (2001), pp. 12/13.
46 See also Ferguson (2002).
47 See Ferguson (2002).
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To sum-up, it might not be absolutely necessary for the Fed to publish a
numerical inflation target. But if we weigh up the pros and cons we can rather
see a gain (at least no loss) in transparency for the Fed in announcing a numeri-
cal inflation target. This is particularly the case if we consider that an inflation
target is normally only an orientation point of the medium-term so that meas-
urement errors hardly count.
The criticism of the second (growth and employment) goal starts with the
verbal definition. The term “maximum employment” is certainly misleading and
should be clarified in an official Fed publication. The Fed could provide addi-
tional transparency with a numerical definition of the employment target. The
announcement of a natural unemployment rate or a target rate for real growth
that equals estimated potential growth would be possible ways of achieving a
numerical definition.48
Apart from the criticism of the unclear target definition there is a more
fundamental criticism that principally rejects the dual mandate. According to
this line of criticism the equal value of the two goals weakens the Fed’s credibil-
ity. This is why these critics demand a clear mandate with price stability as the
overriding, long-run goal. This would focus public debates on what monetary
policy can do, namely maintaining price stability and lessen the pressure on the
Fed to engage in expansionary policy.49
48 If we consider the problems of estimating the NAIRU (see e.g. Staiger/Watson [1997]) it
is certainly even more difficult to correctly measure the employment goal than the infla-
tion goal. For this reason Ferguson rejects categorically the quantification of employment
targets, see Ferguson (2002).
49 See Mishkin (2000), p. 8. An additional point of criticism is that the dual mandate lessens
the accountability of the Fed: “ … with its broad mandate, the Fed can always escape
criticism – and possibly hide its mistakes – by explaining that it had been working hard at
confronting its many and occasionally conflicting obligations.“ Wyplosz (2001), p. 5.
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But there are also some arguments in favor of the maintenance of the dual
mandate:50
 Several investigations meanwhile support the thesis that monetary policy is
able to smooth output and employment volatilities.51
 A central bank with a hierarchical mandate would always be forced to de-
cide in favor of lowering the inflation variability in situations where mone-
tary policy is confronted with a trade-off between output and inflation vari-
ability. However this does not correspond to public preferences. The public
not only favors stable prices but also full employment.
We can recognize that in the practice of monetary policy even central
banks with a sole legal mandate to pursue price stability also consider output
goals.52 But obviously it is a widespread tactical procedure to mention publicly
only one target – price stability. With this, any doubts about the credibility of the
inflation target should be dispelled from the outset.53 However, if we take the
demand for high transparency seriously then the dual mandate should be wel-
comed and the Fed be praised for its openness in view of the output goal.
To sum-up, the Fed has kept some secrecy in the field of the definition and
interpretation of its targets. The Fed’s monetary policy could probably become
50 See Meyer (2001), pp. 5-7, and Yellen (1996), pp. 3/4.
51 Research studies in the field of monetary policy rules show that those rules are most effi-
ciently which attempt to reduce both price and output variability, see Taylor (1993), pp.
200-202.
52 It is frequently emphasized that Inflation Targeting central banks do not carry out “strict”
but “flexible” Inflation Targeting in practice, i.e. they pay also attention to output goals,
see e.g. Svensson (1999), pp. 625/626.
53 Two foreign central bankers once “lectured” Fed Governor Meyer in the following way:
“a disciplined central banker would never admit to having a stabilization objective ...
Such admission ... would only undermine the public’s confidence in a central banker’s
commitment to price stability.” Meyer (2001), p. 8. Poole argues in a similar way: “... it
is important that the Fed not overemphasize any of the short-run objectives because doing
so may create expectations in the market that ... will be inconsistent with the inflation ob-
jective.“ Poole (2000).
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more transparent for the public with a quantification of the inflation target and
an official clarification of the term “maximum employment”. The general com-
plaints about the dual mandate are less convincing. Virtually all central banks
consider employment goals. So the Fed expresses openly what others only admit
in confidence.
4. The Operating Procedure of the Fed
4.1 From Monetary Targeting to a Multi-Indicator Approach
Since a direct steering of inflation and employment is not possible (owing to
monetary lags) the Fed needs an operating procedure to achieve its final targets.
Commonly used operating procedures of other central banks to achieve the pri-
mary goal of low inflation are: Monetary Targeting, Inflation Targeting or Ex-
change Rate Targeting. Can we assign the Fed policy to one of these popular
strategies or can we even recognize other rule-like behavior?
Between 1979 and 1982 the Fed quite strictly carried out a strategy of
Monetary Targeting.54 However the announced monetary targets were mostly
missed because of an unstable money demand.55 This is why the Fed soon gave
up its “experiments in practical monetarism” (Volcker [1977], p. 26). Thereaf-
ter the Fed still closely considered the wider monetary aggregate M2. However
the signals from this aggregate also became more and more unreliable owing to
a rise in the velocity of M2.56 Therefore since about 1993 the Fed has disre-
54 In this period the Fed did not only announce monetary targets what was already the case
before 1979 but also tried to use the monetary base instead of the short-term interest rate
as an operating target. See for an overview of this period Meulendyke (1998), Bofinger et
al. pp. 279-284, or Bernanke/Mishkin (1992), pp. 11-17.
55 The instability of the monetary demand referred especially to the narrow monetary ag-
gregate M1 which was at that time the primary goal variable. The yearly monetary targets
(with regard to M1) have been exceeded in 1980 and 1982 and fell below in 1981, see
Bernanke/Mishkin (1992), p. 13.
56 See Greenspan (1997), p. 2, and Board of Governors (1994), pp. 27-29.
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garded for the most part monetary aggregates when deciding monetary policy.57
Mankiw concluded that against the background of the exceptional economic per-
formance in the 1990s this procedure of ignoring the monetary aggregates has
been quite successful. 58
Following Monetary Targeting no other intermediate target has been found
which would have been appropriate to take over the leading function of the
monetary aggregates. Instead of a paramount indicator, the Fed nowadays uses a
broad range of indicators to assess the stance of monetary policy. Therefore the
Fed approach is called a “multi-indicator” strategy.59 With this approach the US
monetary policy became more discretionary and eclectic as the Federal Reserve
Board admitted itself.60
The following table presents some examples of indicators the Fed used to
justify its monetary policy decisions in the period from June 1999 to August
2001. They are taken from the Press Releases, the Monetary Policy Reports to
the Congress and the Minutes of the FOMC meetings.
57 Until February 2000 the Fed was legally forced to announce target ranges for the mone-
tary aggregates M2 and M3. However, the Fed always emphasized that it does not pay
much attention to these targets. In July 2000 the Fed stopped formulating monetary tar-
gets, see Board of Governors (2000b), p. 62.
58 “If ... the performance of the economy is any guide, this policy of ignoring data on the
monetary aggregates has proven a remarkably effective operating procedure.” Mankiw
(2001), p. 35.
59 Others call it a “just do it”-strategy (Mishkin [1999], p. 601) or a “looking at everything”-
strategy (See Issing [1998], p. 6, or SVR [1999], p. 236).
60 See Board of Governos (1994), p. 32. “Thus, as the historic relationship between meas-
ured money supply and spending deteriorated, policymaking, seeing no alternative,
turned more eclectic and discretionary.” Greenspan (1997).
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Table 2: Explanations for Interest Rate Decisions
(June 1999 - August 2001)
June to November 1999: Interest rate hikes: 4.75 5.5 %
General situational description Inflationary risks
Domestic demand Strong consumer and business demand
Supply side Tight labour markets
Price developments Prices of imports(in particular commodity
prices)
Recovery of foreign economiesInternational Development
(After the Asian crises) Relaxation on international financial markets
February to Mai 2000: Interest rate hikes: 5,5 6,5 %
General situational description Growth rate of demand >Growth rate of production potential
Extensive consumption expenditures (consumer
confidence, wealth effects)Domestic demand
High business spending in high-tech capital
goods
Taut labour markets (indications of increasing
labour costs)Supply side
Large trade deficit (further imports are limited)
Financial markets Expectation of restrictive policy actions
June to November 2000: Constant federal reserve rate of 6.5 %
General situational descrip-
tion
Aggregate demand moderates toward a more sus-
tainable pace, slight inflation risks
Domestic demand
Consumer demand(stock markets, household
dept, signs of saturation in the markets for du-
rable goods)
Supply side Taut labour markets (but also high productivitygrowth)
Financial markets Tighter financial market conditions
Price developments Energy prices(Risk of increasing inflation ex-
pectations)
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January to May 2001: Interest rate cut 6,5 4 %
General situational description Danger of recession, inflation contained
Production(Excess inventories)Economic activity
Retail sales
Consumer confidence
Purchasing Power(Energy costs)Consumer demand
Stock prices
Business confidence 
Business profit marginsBusiness demand
Tight financial market conditions
External demand Global economic weakness
No signs of abating gains in productivity
Inflation Perspectives Sluggish demand (resource utilization, firms
are not able to raise prices, well-anchored infla-
tion expectations)
June to August 2001: Reduced interest rate cuts 4 3,5 %
General situational description Still danger of recession, but first signs of aturnaround
Forecasts of business profits and sales
Low business and consumer confidence
Stock prices
Real income(unemployment rate)
Restraining factors
Weak external demand
Stimulative financial market conditions (low
real rates)
Energy prices
Tax cuts
Stimulative factors
Continued high rates of technological progress
expected
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It is conspicuous that real economic, rather than monetary indicators domi-
nate in explaining decisions. With the help of these indicators the Fed analyses
the supply and demand side of the economy and judges if aggregate demand is
in balance with aggregate supply. If there are convincing indications of an out-
put gap the Fed tries with corresponding interest rate movements to bring aggre-
gate demand again in line with potential supply. Two examples should explain
this way of proceeding:
- At the beginning of the year 2000 the Fed was sure that aggregate demand
exceeded the expansion of production potential (see also the table of indi-
cators). Interest rate hikes should therefore moderate aggregate demand:
“The Committee’s decision to tighten its policy stance was intended to help
bring growth of aggregate demand into better alignment with the expan-
sion of aggregate sustainable supply … Relatively high real interest rates
would be required to accomplish this objective.” Board of Governors
(2000b), pp. 207/208.
- At the beginning of 2001 we had the opposite situation. It was rapidly clear
that the economic growth would soon be below the potential growth and it
followed interest rate cuts.
“… the economy appears to be on track well below the … rate of growth of
its potential.“ Greenspan (2001a).
It is an ideal situation for the Fed when the economic growth rate corre-
sponds with the growth rate of potential supply. The Fed can then realize both
targets – maximum employment and price stability.
The Fed carries out a thorough investigation of the current economic situa-
tion to diagnose a positive or negative output gap. It presents this situational de-
scription of the economy to the public in the Congressional Reports and the
Minutes. In particular the development of the different components of demand
The Fed-Strategy: Successful but Out-of-Date? 21
(consumer, business, public and export demand) is described therein in detail.
Another emphasis is put on the analyses of the labour market which should
show limits or scopes on the supply side. Of course price developments and dif-
ferent price indexes (producer prices, energy prices) are regarded carefully to
early discern other sources of price pressure than labour costs. With the help of
this economic description presented in the Minutes and the Congressional Re-
ports the public knows what the Fed thinks about the current economic situation.
But this in itself does not lead to transparency in monetary policy. Up to
now the Fed neglected to explain the transfer of the economic analysis in mone-
tary policy decisions. There is a wide gap between the extensive description of
the economic situation and the rather paltry explanation of policy decisions. The
Fed always mentions only some indicators to justify its decisions as can be seen
from the table of indicators. It does not present a complete overview of the indi-
vidual indicators and their monetary policy signals. The public can only guess
what priority or weight the Fed assigns to the different factors.
Advocates of Monetary Targeting in particular therefore heavily criticise
the Fed’s multi-indicator approach which is lacking a clear hierarchical structure
of the indicators:61
 The American general public may soon get the impression that monetary
decisions are randomly justified since the Fed always chooses only some of
the relevant indicators to explain its decisions.
 In addition the different indicators will often send out opposing signals and
the Fed will frequently be able to give a convincing justification for interest
rate hikes and cuts at the same time. That is why this approach grants the
central bank enormous discretionary scope.
61 See for a general critic of the multi-indicator approach: Issing (1998), p. 6, SVR (1999),
p. 236, and Deutsche Bundesbank (1995), pp. 67/68.
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 Owing to the various indicators the approach is very complex. This might
lead to disorientation and uncertainty in the markets. Because of this, it will
be difficult for the markets to predict future monetary policy moves.
For these reasons a part of the monetary policy profession does not con-
sider the approach as being suitable in promoting credibility and predictability in
monetary policy. They recommend that the Fed should follow a more rule-
oriented approach.62 But we can also mention two other possibilities for enhanc-
ing the transparency without changing the whole strategy.
One way to structure the approach more clearly could be the drawing of a
raster which sorts the various indicators into some categories. Such categories
could be: “labour market”, “consumer demand”, “business demand” etc. Each
category could then produce its own policy recommendation (neutral, expansive,
restrictive). In times with low unemployment rates and rising unit labour costs a
category “labour market” would send for example a restrictive signal and there-
fore recommend a monetary tightening. Additionally the individual categories
should be weighted according to their importance for monetary policy.
A second way to illustrate more clearly the monetary policy thinking of the
Fed could be the publication of the centrally used macroeconometric model. The
staff of the Fed has developed such a model to estimate the economic conse-
quences of different monetary policy options (e.g. an interest rate increase by 25
or 50 basis points). Because of the incorporated assumptions this so-called
FRB/US model belongs to the class of “New Keynesian” models.63 Among
other things it presumes that prices adjust only gradually so that markets do not
quickly clear after disturbances. Owing to these price rigidities the central bank
62 “The Fed should examine the reintroduction of Monetary Targeting.” Tigges (2001), p.13
(translation D.H.). See also Mankiw (2000), p. 12.
63 See for an overview of the model e.g. Reifschneider et al. (1999), or Brayton/Tinsley
(1996).
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is able to make an influence on the real interest rate and hence on the inflation
and output development. The model is in accordance with the Fed’s philosophy
because it assumes that monetary policy can mitigate output volatilities by alter-
ing financial market conditions.64 But for different reasons the FRB/US model
also gives no clear indication to the general public about US monetary policy:
 It is only one among many inputs for the decision-making process and by
no means the most important one.65
 The Fed-staff has developed the model without the cooperation of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board. Therefore the model does not necessarily represent the
opinion of Greenspan and his colleagues.
To sum-up, whereas in the 1970s and 1980s monetary aggregates domi-
nated in assessing the stance of monetary policy, today the Fed uses a broad
range of real economic indicators as the basis for the decision-making process.
With the help of these indicators the US central bank analyses the supply and
demand side of the economy and judges if aggregate demand is in balance with
aggregate supply. In the case of a supposed positive (negative) output gap the
Fed increases (decreases) the real federal funds rate to bring aggregate demand
again in line with potential supply. With the help of different sources (Minutes,
Congressional Reports) the Fed gives the public an extensive insight into its as-
sessment of the current economic situation. But the link from economic analysis
to monetary decisions is less transparent in the American policy. The Fed ex-
plains its decisions quite selectively with only a few suitable indicators. It does
not present a general overview of the stance of monetary policy. Critics consider
the complex “looking at everything” approach used by the Fed as not suitable in
promoting credibility and predictability in monetary policy.
64 See Reifschneider et al. (1999), pp. 1/2.
65 See Blinder et al. (2001), p. 35.
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4.2 The Fed – an Inflation Targeter?
In the 1990s several central banks have (like the Fed) abandoned a strategy with
an intermediate target and switched to a multi-indicator approach. But in con-
trast to the Fed some central banks (e.g. Bank of England) developed this ap-
proach further to the new strategy of Inflation Targeting. In this framework an
inflation forecast that the central bank produces itself plays the central role. This
forecast can be seen as a condensation of the multitude of indicators. It summa-
rizes the different and partly inconsistent signals about the future inflation de-
velopment to a clear overall picture.66 Therefore the inflation forecast is a sort of
an artificial intermediate target and interest rate decisions are made on the basis
of a comparison between the inflation forecast and the inflation target.67 This
procedure should make monetary policy more rule-like. At the same time it
should become easier for the public to comprehend monetary policy decisions
since the central bank is forced to summarize its view about the future inflation
development in one sole figure.
Certain similarities of the Fed policy to Inflation Targeting can not be de-
nied. Mankiw for example describes the proceeding of the Fed in the 1990s as
“covert ‘inflation targeting’” (Mankiw [2001], p. 51).68 In particular the attempt
of the Fed to act in a forward-looking and pre-emptive way resembles an Infla-
tion Targeter. Besides, Greenspan emphasizes at every opportunity the central
role of forecasts in US monetary policy.69
66 “The inflation forecast which is estimated by the National Bank is used as a concentrated
summarize of the current situation.” Roth (2002), p.10 (translation D.H.).
67 King was the first person who introduced the idea of an inflation forecast as an intermedi-
ate target (see King [1994], p. 118). Svensson theoretically underpinned this notion (see
Svensson [1997]). In the mean time it is also adopted by central bankers (see e.g. Good-
hard [1999], p. 104, or Berg [1999], p. 47). Therefore it would be more precise to speak
of “Inflation Forecast Targeting” instead of “Inflation Targeting”, see Svensson (1997),
or Haldane (1998), p. 5.
68 See also Bernanke et al. (1999), p. 310.
69 “... expectations about future economic developments nonetheless inevitably play a cru-
cial role in our policymaking. “ Greenspan (2001b).
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Correspondingly enormous resources are devoted to the activity of fore-
casting.70 Two forecasts play a particular role in the policy-making of the Fed:
 The economic forecasts in the Monetary Policy Reports to the Congress:
Twice a year each member of the Federal Reserve Board and each Presi-
dent of the Federal Reserve district banks makes an independent forecast
about employment, growth and inflation. The ranges and “central tenden-
cies” of these forecasts are published in the semi-annual Monetary Policy
Report to the Congress.
 The Greenbook forecasts (named after the colour of its cover): Before each
FOMC meeting (which means eight times a year) the staff of the Fed
makes a forecast which is discussed intensively. It obviously plays a crucial
role in the internal decision-making process.71 But this staff forecast is not
disclosed to the public.
One can see clear similarities between the Fed and an Inflation Targeter in
the use of these forecasts for interest rate decisions. An Inflation Targeter in-
creases (decreases) interest rest rates if the inflation forecast is above (below)
the inflation target and hence aims to equalize the inflation forecast with the in-
flation target.72 The Fed’s decisions are obviously also strongly based on a com-
parison between forecasts and targets. A statement of Vice-President Ferguson
for example could also come from an Inflation Targeter:
“Based on these forecasts we can then take steps to adjust the stance of
monetary policy as necessary, in accordance with our objectives.“ Ferguson
(1998).
70 See Blinder (1997), p. 10.
71 This is the impression one gets from the verbatim transcripts which are released with a
five year lag.
72 See Svensson (1997), p. 1120.
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Like an Inflation Targeter the Fed not only considers a point forecast but
also the probability distribution of its projections:73
“Because accurate point forecasts are extraordinarily difficult to fashion,
we are forced also to consider the probability distribution of possible out-
comes.” Greenspan (2001b).
Two points should be kept in mind when we compare the Fed with an In-
flation Targeting central bank. Firstly, quantitative targets of the Fed are at best
implicitly given. Secondly, owing to the dual mandate not only the Fed’s infla-
tion forecast but also its growth and employment forecast is of importance.
The interest rate cuts in the first half of 2001 are a good example to show
the similarities of the Fed’s decision-making process to those of an Inflation
Targeter. Greenspan explicitly justified the several downward fed funds move-
ments with regard to the Fed’s growth and inflation projections:74
- At the beginning of the year all growth forecasts of the Fed assumed that
the weakness of aggregate demand will persist for a longer time.
- The risk of a worse growth development than assumed was seen higher
than the chance of a better growth development than mainly projected
(“downside risks”).
- The inflation forecasts have rather shown a downward tendency.
To sum-up, it was quite probable that economic growth as well as inflation
would fall below the implicit Fed targets. A monetary easing seemed to be nec-
essary. The following table should illustrate this judgment of the monetary situa-
73 The Bank of England has for example used the famous “fan charts” to draw possible fu-
ture inflation outcomes; see Bank of England (1999a), p. 52.
74 See Greenspan (2001b).
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tion in July 2001. An inflation target of 2.5-% and a growth target of 3.5 % are
assumed. These targets are confronted with the forecasts of the July-Report to
the Congress.
Table 3: The Assessment of the Monetary Policy Situation in July 2001
Forecast 2002 Risks ImplicitTargets
Forecast versus
Target
Conclu-
sion
Inflation 1.75 – 2.5 % 2.5 % Forecast < Target i75
Growth 3.0 – 3.25 % „down-side“ 3.5 % Forecast < Target i
Despite these similarities the Fed can not be considered as a real Inflation
Targeter because of at least two reasons:
 The Fed does not have explicit inflation and growth targets with which the
forecasts could be compared.
 There are no official inflation and growth forecasts of the FOMC – the de-
cision-making committee of the Fed.
An inflation and growth forecast can only take the role of an intermediate
target if it expresses the common opinion of the decision-making committee.
This perquisite is met in the case of the Bank of England. The Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC) has the final decision-making powers about the exact shape
of the published inflation forecast. The forecast normally reflects the judgment
of all MPC members.76 This is different in the case of the Fed.
75 i = federal funds rate (interest rate)
76 In the preamble to each “Inflation Report” it is said: “… the fan charts represent the
MPC’s best collective judgement about the most likely paths for inflation and output …“
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The Greenbook (or staff) forecast is prepared without the participation of
the members of the FOMC. As a result “the forecast is clearly the staff’s, not
the FOMC’s, and FOMC members frequently take issue with it at meetings.”
(Blinder et al. [2001], p. 32.)
The forecasts in the Congressional Reports are published but they are made
separately by each member of the FOMC. There is no coordination between the
FOMC members or any agreement about the forecast method.
In addition neither the Greenbook forecast nor the forecasts in the Con-
gressional Reports are used as an external communication instrument to justify
monetary policy decisions. The staff forecast is treated as a secret and the semi-
annual forecasts in the Reports to the Congress are often only mentioned by the
way when Fed members justify decisions.
To conclude, it would have been possible for the Fed to develop further its
multi-indicator approach to Inflation Targeting. Similarities to Inflation Target-
ing are perceptible. The Fed tries hard to act foresightedly and pre-emptively.
Therefore forecasts play an important role in the decision-making process. This
has in particular become clear at the beginning of 2001. At that time all growth
and inflation projections of the Fed have pointed downward and hence the Fed
begun a series of interest rate cuts. However, the Fed lacks both explicit quanti-
tative targets and official inflation and output forecasts of the FOMC. Since
there are only implicit targets and secret or varied forecasts, the FOMC is not
forced to compare regularly official forecasts with explicit targets.
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4.3 Does the Fed follow the Taylor-Rule?
The reflections of the two previous chapters suggest that the Fed is carrying out
a fairly discretionary policy. The US central bank considers a multitude of indi-
cators without giving the public an exact reaction pattern. Some economists
have tried to estimate the Fed’s reaction function to find out if the Fed follows a
certain system. Until the beginning of the 1990s they failed to build a stable
fairly long-term reaction function. 77
However, in 1993 the economist John B. Taylor showed in a meanwhile
very famous article that the Fed policy of Greenspan could at least be described
quite precisely by a very simple interest rate rule (see Taylor [1993]).78 This is
nowadays called the Taylor-Rule which has in its original version the following
shape:
it = 2 +t + 0,5 (t - 2) + 0,5 (yt)
where i denotes the federal funds rate, is the inflation rate and y denotes
the output gab. The two essential elements of the rule are an inflation gap (dif-
ference between the current inflation rate and an inflation target of 2 %) and an
output gap (percent deviation of real GDP from a target). In the case of price
stability (here = 2 %) and full employment (zero output gap) the rule recom-
mends an equilibrium nominal interest rate of 4 % which corresponds to a real
level of 2 %. The rule recommends a rise in the fed funds rate if either the infla-
tion increases above the target or the real GDP rises above trend GDP.
Taylor discovered that his simple rule captures quite exactly the move-
ments of the federal funds rate in the period from 1987-1992. Thereafter the
77 See e.g. Khoury (1990), or McNeess (1992).
78 Taylor itself pointed out that his rule “was not fit to the data in the sense of a regression”
(Taylor [1998a], p. 14). Hence Taylor originally did not attempt to develop a reaction
function. The purpose of its rule was rather normative than positive.
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connection became a little bit loose but all in all one can say that the Tay-
lor-Rule describes reasonably well the Greenspan-Fed.79 Distinct deviations of
the factual interest rate policy from the Taylor-Rule have been limited to two
cases:80
1) Financial market crises (stock market crash 1987, the credit crunch 1992,
the Asian and Russian crises 1998).
2) Periods when the Fed acted especially pre-emptively (1994, 2001).
These quite synchronous movements of the Taylor interest rate and the fed
funds rate are not surprising if we recall the policy procedure of the Fed that is
described in chapter 4. The Fed raises the real fed funds rate above a neutral
level if the different considered economic indicators suggest a positive output
gap or if other sources of inflation pressure occur. The Taylor-Rule propagates
nearly the same procedure. The two main components of the rule – Inflation and
Output gap – are so to say the essence of the Fed’s monetary policy.81
Some “Fed-Watchers” already make use of this narrow correlation between
the Fed’s interest rate policy and the Taylor-Rule. They try to predict the Fed’s
future interest rate movements with the help of the (partly modified) Taylor-
Rule.82
79 This in particular becomes clear if we apply the comparison between the Taylor interest
rate and the fed funds rate to former periods. In former times the deviations between the
two rates have been more distinct, see Taylor (1999), and Judd/Rudebusch (1998), pp.
5/6. The Taylor-Rule can be better fitted to the fed funds rate in the second half of the 90s
if firstly, one uses the output gap instead of the NAIRU as a measure of economic slack
and if secondly, one assumes a declining NAIRU in the late 90s. Obviously the Fed has
considered this shift in the NAIRU in its interest rate policy. See Ball/Tchaidze (2002).
80 See Hartmann (2001), pp. 44-47.
81 “...the two variables determining the policy stance under the [Taylor-] rule clearly are of
central concern to the Federal Reserve.“ Yellen (1996), p. 8.
82 Examples are: HSBC, Merrill Lynch, DB Research, Goldman Sachs: See Shepherdson
(1997), Lucas/Quek (1998), Dallmeyer/Gräf (2000), FAZ (2001e), p. 27.
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The Taylor-Rule also got attention inside the Federal Reserve System.
There are some indications of this interest:
 Some Fed Governors have expressed an explicitly positive attitude towards
the Taylor-Rule and praised its positive qualities.83
 During each FOMC meeting the Fed-staff presents the recommendations of
different monetary policy rules (among them the Taylor-Rule) for the Fed’s
interest rate policy.84
 The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis depicts the development of a Taylor
interest rate (under consideration of different inflation targets) in its publi-
cation “Monetary Trends”.
Nevertheless, there is no real commitment to a rule in the case of the Fed.
An official commitment to a policy rule would contain the obligation to justify
for deviations of the rule. The Fed is far away from such a procedure:
 Until now the existing instruments (Congressional Reports, Minutes),
which are used to justify monetary policy decisions, do not say a word
about the Taylor-Rule.
 The Taylor-Rule can only function as a benchmark for the Fed’s interest
rate policy if it is possible to calculate an official Taylor interest rate. But
this would require that the Fed firstly fixes a numerical inflation target,
secondly publishes its estimation about the output gab and thirdly an-
nounces its estimation about a neutral level of the real interest rate.
At the moment there is no indication of an attempt to commit more strongly
to a rule inside the Fed. Even those American policymakers who consider the
83 See e.g. Meyer (1998), Gramlich (1998), and Yellen (1996), p. 10.
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Taylor-Rule as a useful instrument speak at best of it as a rough guide.85 Green-
span is quite unambiguous in the rejection of a commitment to a rule.86 In any
case it would be necessary to modify the original Taylor-Rule to use it in the
practice of American policy since the Fed frequently acts more pre-emptively as
this is possible with the original Taylor-Rule. Hence the predicted values of the
Output and Inflation gap should be taken instead of the actual ones.87
To sum-up, the procedure of the Fed indeed contains some similarities to
the modern framework of Inflation Targeting and can quite well be described by
the popular Taylor-Rule. But the Fed uses none of these strategies as a public
instrument of communication. The Fed justifies itself neither regularly for devia-
tions from an official Taylor interest rate nor does the Fed explain deviations
from an official inflation forecast made by the members of the FOMC. The Fed-
Strategy is therefore rightly devoted as a purely multi-indicator approach.
84 See Taylor (1998a), p. 15.
85 See Gramlich (1998), or Yellen (1996), p. 10.
86 See Greenspan (1997).
87 In this case Ex-Governor Meyer speaks of a “forward-looking version of the Taylor-
Rule”. Meyer (1997).
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5 Credibility and Transparency of the Fed-strategy from
the Markets point of View
5.1 The Development of the Inflation Expectations
The theoretical analysis up to now suggests that the Fed policy should be revised
since the current procedure does not seem to be suitable in promoting credibility
and transparency to the public. To sum-up, the arguments are as follows:
 The Fed’s goals are not clearly defined.
 Price stability is not given the highest priority.
 The Fed is carrying out a pure multi-indicator approach which is less trans-
parent and rule-based than strategies which use simple rules of thumb or in-
termediate targets in their centre.
 The Fed publishes neither its internal inflation forecast (Greenbook fore-
cast) nor does it have a central macroeconometric model.
However, the academic criticism of the Fed-Strategy will only be plausible
if we can see it in corresponding market reactions (volatilities, inflation premi-
ums). In the following section the judgment of the markets regarding the credi-
bility and transparency of the Fed is examined on the basis of three questions:
 How have private inflation expectations developed in the last 10-15 years?
 How did the markets react to the relatively employment friendly monetary
policy of the year 2001?
 How well do the markets anticipate the monetary policy actions of the Fed?
The development of the private inflation expectations should give a first
impression of the public credibility of the Fed and show us if the assessment of
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Figure 1: Development of Long-term Inflation
Expectations in the USA 1987-2002
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the Fed policy has changed over time. High and strong fluctuating inflation ex-
pectations would be an indication of low confidence in a consequent policy of
inflation fighting.
A commonly used instrument to measure the private American inflation
expectations is the “Survey of Professional Forecasters” of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia. Within this survey different private and public institutions
(such as banks, consulting firms or research facilities) are asked for their infla-
tion assessments. Among other things they should also give a 10-year inflation
forecast.88 In the following graph the long-term inflation expectations are com-
pared since 1987.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
88 See for a more detailed description of the procedure Croushore (1993).
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From this we can draw the following conclusions:
 Long-term private inflation expectations have dropped steadily from over
4-% to about 2.5 % since the end of the eighties.
 Although the current inflation rate has fluctuated since 1998 in a range of
1.5 – 3.5 %, the inflation expectations remained stable.
 Obviously the public interprets an inflation rate of 2.5 % as an implicit in-
flation target of the Fed.
Financial market prices are a second source (apart from surveys) for deduc-
ing private inflation expectations. This means of assessing inflation expectations
has been facilitated since 1997 with the issuing of inflation-protected bonds by
the US Treasury (TIPS, Treasury Inflation Protected Securities). The difference
between the nominal yields of conventional bonds and the real yields of infla-
tion-protected bonds of the same maturity is called “break-even inflation rate”
and can be seen as a benchmark for private inflation expectations.89 Figure 2 de-
scribes the development of the “break-even inflation rate” since 1997 (for ten-
year and thirty-year Treasuries). The outcomes are similar to the survey results.
Private inflation expectations are quite low and stable. They fluctuate in a nar-
row range of 1.5 - 2.5 %.90
89 The “break-even inflation rate” reflects the inflation expectations only distorted in par-
ticular for two reasons: While indexed securities contain a risk premium (protection
against unanticipated changes in inflation), conventional bonds contain a liquidity pre-
mium (the level of liquidity is normally higher). The risk premium of TIPS overestimates
the break-even inflation rate. The liquidity premium works in the other direction. It nor-
mally is assumed that the first effect (risk premium) is of greater magnitude and therefore
the break-even inflation rate slightly overstates the inflation expectations; see ECB
(1999b), p. 16, and Sack (2000), pp. 5/6.
90 It is a little bit surprising that the level of estimated inflation expectations is even lower
than in the case of the SPF. It is usually supposed that the break-even inflation rate
slightly overestimates the factual inflation expectations (see previous footnote).
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Figure 2: “Break-even inflation rate” since 1997
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Monetary Trends May 2002, p. 11.
To sum-up, private inflation expectations give no indication of a decline in
the Fed’s credibility which could be caused by a confusing strategy. Rather the
drop in inflation expectations and the increasing independence of expectations
from real inflation development suggest a gain in reputation in the 1990s.
5.2 Market Reactions to the Policy of Interest Rate Cutting in the
Year 2001
A test for the credibility of the Fed has been the strongly growth-orientated
monetary policy of the Fed in the year 2001. Such an anticyclical policy can
only be carried out without causing higher inflation expectations by a central
bank with a high credibility.91 The success of this policy is a controversial area.
Figure 3 should explain why this is the case. It describes parallel to the devel-
opment of the federal funds rate the development of long-term and the
short-term interest rates.
91 See e.g. Spahn (1999), pp. 301/302.
The Fed-Strategy: Successful but Out-of-Date? 37
The short-term interest rates closely followed the decreasing federal funds
rate, but the long-term interest rates only initially. Since April 2001 at the latest
the long-term interest rates moved upwards and reached a level comparable to
the time before the interest rate cuts of the Fed began. But it is precisely the
long-term interest rate which is seen as one crucial factor for the recovery of the
economy.
Date source: Federal Reserve Board
We can distinguish three explanations for this interest rate development:
(1) Critics of the Fed policy claim that rising inflation fears are responsible for
the increase of capital market interest rates.92 They think that the Fed has
gone too far with the monetary policy easing and, instead of the intended
92 After the interest rate cut in May 2001 the mood at the security markets was described in
the following way: “Traders at capital markets are the more and more afraid that the Fed
has overshot the mark with its interest rate movement and that the expected cyclical
swing will be accompanied by a distinct price push. Some economists even warn that the
Fed risks its credibility in inflation fighting.” FAZ (2001c), p. 33 (translation D.H.).
Figure 3: The Fed's Policy of Interest Rate Cutting
in 2001
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improvement has caused a deterioration of the investment climate. A
statement of the ECB expresses this thinking:
“The main factor behind the continued increase in US nominal long-term
bond yields in the second quarter of 2001 seemed to be raising inflation
expectations and inflation uncertainty on the part of investors.” ECB
(2001a), p. 30.
But as we have seen before there is no clear indication of an increase in in-
flation fears in the year 2001. Survey results as well as financial market
prices show that price expectations have been quite stable. From the
“break-even inflation rate” you could perhaps deduce a slight increase of
inflation expectations of 0.25 – 0.5 percent points.93
(2) This is why an alternative explanation seems to be more realistic: It is not
higher inflation expectations but higher real interest rates that have caused
the increasing bond yields. According to this view the interest rates cuts
have raised the hope in the markets that the slump will soon be overcome
and that in the near future company gains and capital yields will recover.
Obviously this is also the interpretation of the Federal Reserve:
“The increase in longer-term Treasury yields in the second quarter ap-
pears to have been the result of a number of factors. The main influence
seems to have been increased investor confidence that the economy would
soon pick up.“ Board of Governors (2001), p. 520.94
93 From the Fed’s point of view this slight increase of expectations has rather been a correc-
tion of the extremely low expectations at the end of the year 2000, see Board of Gover-
nors (2001), p. 520.
94 According to Greenspan this interpretation is at least possible: “... it is difficult to judge
whether long-term rates have held up because of firming inflation expectations or a belief
that economic growth is likely to strengthen, spurring a rise in real long-term rates.”
Greenspan (2001b).
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(3) Finally the supply side of U.S. Treasuries plays a role in explaining the de-
velopment of the term structure of interest rates. With the announcement of
tax cuts in April 2001 it was clear for the public that the U.S. budget sur-
plus – and therefore the expected shortage in long-term bonds – was
smaller than originally supposed.95
To sum-up, the second and third argument seem to be quite persuasive and
suggest that only a small part of the increase in bond yields could be attributed
to temporary higher inflation fears. We can therefore conclude that the reputa-
tion of the Fed has been sufficient to carry out an anticyclical stabilization pol-
icy. The supposed increase in real interest rates even indicates a very high confi-
dence in the Fed in overcoming the economic slump.
5.3 The Predictability of the Fed’s Interest Rate Decisions for the
Markets
Since – as the critics claim – the US central bank does not possess a clear con-
ceptual framework we must assume that the policy of the Fed is rather non-
transparent for the markets. In the following section we will examine if it is true
that the markets have difficulties in predicting the Fed’s behaviour and whether
they are in the main surprised by policy actions.
An instrument that best reflects the expectations of the markets about future
monetary policy actions are the futures on the federal funds. From the prices of
these futures the expected federal funds rate can easily be deduced.96 To exam-
ine the quality of the markets expectations one can compare these expected in-
95 Some economists suppose that the drop in long-term bond yields in the year 2000 can not
be attributed to lower inflation expectations but to the announced shortage in long-term
Treasuries, see Wheelock (2000), p. 1.
96 The settlement price of a federal funds future is 100 minus the effective average funds
rate in the expiry month. If the future price of the January contract is for example 95 we
can suppose that the average expected fed funds rate for January is about 5 %.
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terest rates (deduced from the future markets) with the factual interest rate deci-
sions of the Fed. The result of this comparison is that the markets have antici-
pated most decisions of the Fed quite exactly especially since 1994.
An example of this was the Fed’s interest rate decision on May 16th 2000.
On this day the Fed raised the intended fed funds rate by 50 basis points from 6
to 6.5 %. It was the last step in a series of interest rate increases since June 1999.
Although it was an unusually strong interest rate increase by 50 basis points it
was completely predicted by the markets.97
The markets expectations regarding the interest rate decision on May 16th
are best reflected in the June (and not the May) future contract. This can be ex-
plained in the following way: One can assume that interest rate decisions are
normally made at the regular open market meetings which take place every 6
weeks on average. It is then quite probable that an interest rate decision made in
mid-May is prevailing in the whole of June.98
Figure 4: Fed Funds Futures and the Fed’s Interest Rate Target
Source: Poole (2000).
97 The Fed normally moves more cautiously and prefers small steps of 25 basis points. The
last fed funds rate increase by 50 basis points has taken place in February 1995.
98 In the year 2000 the FOMC meeting which followed May 16 was announced for June 27.
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Figure 4 shows at first that the intended federal funds rate stayed before
May 16th at 6 %. The expected interest rate of the markets which results from the
future price of the June contract has however risen from about 6.25 % at the be-
ginning of April to 6.49 % just before the meeting. Therefore the markets have
completely anticipated the Fed’s interest rate move of 50 basis points.
But the period of May 2000 is by no means the only case in which the mar-
kets succeeded in anticipating quite exactly the interest rate decisions of the Fed.
The conclusion of an examination by Poole and Rasche (carried out in 1999, see
Poole/Rasche [1999]) is rather that precision in foreseeing the Fed’s monetary
policy decisions has dramatically improved since 1994. For the years after 1999
this outcome can be confirmed as can be seen by figure 5.99
In the year 2000 the financial markets anticipated all decisions of the
FOMC with a probability of more than 50 %, in particular the three steps of an
99 The circles, quadrants and crosses represent the interest rate decision between 21.12.1999
and 19.03.2002. The circles describe decisions which have been anticipated by (nearly)
100 %, the black quadrants depicts surprising decisions and the crosses represent deci-
sions with varied expectations.
Figure 5: Fed-Decisions and Financial Markets
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interest rate increase at the beginning of the year and also the end of monetary
policy tightening in June. In the year 2001 some surprises for the markets oc-
curred. This was the case because the Fed acted also on three additional occa-
sions between the regularly scheduled meetings. However the markets again an-
ticipated quite well the decisions that were taken at regular meetings. In June
only about the half of the market participants foresaw the slowing down of
monetary easing and at the end of the year there was also some uncertainty
about the further speed of monetary easing.
Several reasons can be put forward to explain the success of the markets in
guessing interest rate decisions:
1. The Fed simply follows the markets: The Minutes of the FOMC disclose
that the Fed also considers the market expectations regarding the next pol-
icy move of the Fed and prefers to be in line with the markets.100 On the
other hand the Fed did not hesitate to ignore market expectations in situa-
tions where it seemed to be necessary from the Fed’s point of view. Exam-
ples of this are the sudden and forceful interest rate cut in January 2001 as
well as the reaction on the Asian crises 1998. So the Fed certainly does not
only follow the markets.
2. The Fed leaks out the decisions: Poole and Rasche reject this assumption.
According to their examination most of the financial market reactions have
been caused by newly released economic data and not by statements of Fed
officials.101 We can therefore again consider the period of May 2000. The
decisive jump in interest rate expectations from 25 to 50 basis points took
place at the end of April when new economic data had been published. The
100 The interest rate decision on May 16 2000 was justified inter alias in the following way:
“The members saw little risk in the relatively aggressive policy move, given the strong
momentum of the expansion and widespread market expectations of such a move.“ Board
of Governors (2000d), p. 224.
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released growth rates of GDP, consumption expenditures and employment
costs clearly exceeded the expectations. It was therefore supposed that the
US economy was still overheated and a forceful response of the Fed would
be necessary.
3. The markets know the implicit model of the Fed: This is the only possible
explanation that remains if the first two assumptions are rejected. Until
now we can say (see also figure 6):
 Firstly, the markets adjust their interest rate expectations particularly in re-
sponse to newly released data and the Fed adjusts its interest rate decisions
of course also in response to new information.
 Secondly, markets draw the same conclusion from the data as the Fed since
market expectations correspond normally with Fed decisions (the markets
predict most interest rate movements of the Fed).
Figure 6: Do the markets know the implicit model of the Fed?
Interest rate expectations of markets
Newly released data
Interest rate decisions of the Fed
From this we can conclude that the markets and the Fed have the same
model in mind or rather the markets know the theoretical model of the Fed:
„ ... the market acts as if it pretty closely understands the policy model the
Fed uses.“ Poole (2000).
101 In the period 1989 – 1999 only 7 of the 101 examined large changes in future prices
could be attributed to statements of Fed officials, see Poole/Rasche (2000), pp. 19/20.
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However this is inconsistent with the fact that the Fed did not formulate a
clear monetary policy strategy and does not posses a common macroeconomic
model.
How can we explain this paradox: Secrecy about the monetary strategy on
the one hand and high predictability on the other hand?
 Firstly, the tenure of Greenspan has already lasted quite a long time. The
markets have gained experience in his way of carrying out monetary policy
and they know meanwhile which indicators and information are particu-
larly important for Greenspan (for example data from the labour market).
 Secondly, although the Fed was not willing to commit to a rule or to formu-
late a specific strategy it started an offensive to be more transparent for the
markets. Important actions among others have been: (1) Interest rate deci-
sions are made mostly at regular scheduled meetings of the FOMC (and not
between the meetings which was frequently the case before). (2) Since
1999 the FOMC has explained every monetary policy action directly after
its meetings in a short Press Release. (3) Each of these communiqués in-
clude a tendency statement about future interest rate policy.
 Thirdly, although we can not assume that Fed officials signal in advance
their monetary policy decisions, a certain steering of market expectations
by Greenspan nevertheless takes place. From time to time he tries to steer
the market expectations in a desired direction with well-directed statements
about the economy. For example, in January 2001 he mentioned during a
speech about the current economic situation that the growth rate of the
economy had dropped to nearly zero percent. Before the speech most mar-
ket participants expected only an interest rate cut of 25 basis points. After-
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wards the majority assumed a cut of 50 basis points which then was carried
out by the Fed.102
 Fourthly, Greenspan often stresses in speeches some indicators which
should be regarded more closely the next time. At the moment he empha-
sizes for example that the strength of the economic recovery depends espe-
cially on consumer expenditure.103 Therefore the markets concentrate their
attention on indictors of consumer demand. This is Greenspan’s way of
making the multi-indicator approach more transparent.
To sum-up, we can say that the Fed was to a high degree predictable for the
markets in the last years. Financial markets anticipated most interest rate deci-
sions. It was only in some special situations that the Fed carried out a surprising
interest rate step. Therefore a very astonishing result has appeared: The public
and the Fed interpret new economic data commonly though the Fed has never
announced a clear conceptual framework. This can be explained by the very
long tenure of Greenspan, the diplomatic behavior towards the markets and an
improved information policy of the Fed. The latter, however, does not refer to
the policy framework but to the common assessment of the economic situation
by the Fed. All in all we can say that despite the multi-indicator approach the
Fed acts more predictably and comprehensibly than a lot of other central banks
which possess a quantitative inflation target and a well formulated strategy.
Therefore the markets’ judgment about the American monetary policy
gives no reason to change the Fed’s policy concept. Obviously it only remains
one argument that could be used to justify a policy change: The fear that the cur-
rent confidence in the Fed depends exclusively on Greenspan and hence the re-
102 See FAZ (2001a), p. 31.
103 See e.g. Greenspan (2002).
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tirement of Greenspan will cause uncertainty in the markets.104 But this fear
could be moderated by the appointment of a candidate for Fed presidency with
high reputation in monetary policy. John B. Taylor who is discussed as a possi-
ble successor of Greenspan105 would certainly meet this prerequisite. He would
also guarantee a certain continuation in the Fed policy since the Taylor-Rule de-
scribes quite well the monetary policy of the Greenspan era.106
6 Summery and Conclusion
More and more central banks go over to present the public a clear monetary pol-
icy strategy. They announce quantitative targets and publish the indicators,
models and forecasts which are used for monetary analysis. This high degree of
transparency should enhance credibility and predictability and hence lead to a
more efficient monetary policy.
The Fed resisted in some parts the current trends in monetary policy. This
already starts with the formulation of monetary targets. The price stability objec-
tive has no priority over the employment goal in contrast to most other central
banks. Both targets are equally weighted and the Fed policymakers put this dual
mandate into practice. Smoothing business cycles is naturally seen as a task of
monetary policy. However, it could be criticized that the Fed does not have pre-
cise target definitions. The inflation goal is not quantified and the term “maxi-
mum employment” gives room for interpretation.
While the criticism of the insufficient target definitions might be justified
the general criticism of the dual mandate can not be followed. The quite em-
104 Several economists complain about the Fed’s strong dependence of the Fed chairman, see
e.g. Mishkin (1999), p. 600, Checchetti (1999), Tigges (2001), p. 13, and Barbier
(2001), p. 13.
105 See Tigges (2002), p. 15.
106 The fear that Fed policy would become too mechanical with Taylor as a Fed president is
unfounded. He interprets the Taylor-Rule rather as a rough guideline or prominent indica-
tor than a mechanical rule which should be followed in each situation, see Taylor (1993).
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ployment friendly monetary policy in the 1990s did not harm the Fed’s credibil-
ity. The private inflation expectations even decreased at this time and stabilized
around a level of 2.5 %. The Fed also managed the extremely anticyclical policy
of the year 2001 without greater loss in confidence. Therefore the Fed can be
seen as a central bank that used its reputation in an appropriate fashion as an in-
strument to promote employment.
The Fed uses a multitude of indicators which describe the supply and de-
mand situation in the US economy to explain and justify its decisions. This
judgment of the current economic situation is extensively presented to the pub-
lic. However, an exact evaluation of the individual indicators with regard to its
monetary policy consequences is missing. The Fed’s perception of the monetary
policy transmission process also remains unclear. All in all the Fed leaves the
markets to a large extent in the dark about the macro model which forms the ba-
sis of its actions. This is criticized heavily by academics which in general re-
proach the Fed for its lack in systematic behavior.
Financial market reactions contradict this academic view. The markets an-
ticipated most of the Fed’s interest rate decisions quite exactly, in particular
since the mid-1990s. Instead of a clear framework the Fed uses others ways to
obtain this credibility: In speeches and statements Greenspan and his colleagues
refer the markets to indicators which are important for monetary policy in the
next time and therefore should be closely regarded. Besides, after each FOMC
meeting the Fed publishes a tendency statement about future monetary policy.
The Fed gets in strong dependence of the acting persons with this kind of
monetary policy. A clear strategy that integrates the present features (e.g. dual
mandate) could provide a greater continuation in the US monetary policy. Two
alternative strategies (Inflation Targeting and the Taylor-Rule) are available
which already show today some similarities to the current Fed approach. The
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Taylor-Rule captures the Fed’s interest rate movements in the 1990s quite well
and like an Inflation Targeter the Fed extensively uses forecasts when deciding
about its actions. But there are at best similarities. The Fed uses none of these
strategies in the real sense of their academic “inventors”. The Fed justifies itself
neither regularly for deviations from an official Taylor interest rate nor does the
Fed explain deviations from an official inflation forecast made by the members
of the FOMC.
The Fed approach could certainly be developed further to Inflation Target-
ing and in this way monetary policy would perhaps become less dependent of
the persons in charge of the FOMC. On the other hand a new Fed chairman
would in this case no longer have the possibility to react as flexible to new struc-
tural changes (“New Economy”) as Greenspan. Therefore the appointment of a
chairman with high reputation in monetary policy should perhaps be preferred to
a conceptual change.
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